Note: This post was earlier published as an appendix to the post, Link – The Primacy of “Existence” over “Essence” : A Foundational Principle of Christian “Existential” Philosophy.
Our exposition of Aquinas’ thesis on the primacy of existence over essence provides a corrective to Malaysia’s premier philosopher, Naquib al-Attas, who claims that Aquinas’ misguided notion of distinction between existence and essence led to the development of nominalism (or Ockhamism) which denies the ontological reality of universals and asserts that universals are merely names (nomina) or abstract concepts.1Strictly speaking, Ockham’s view should be described as conceptualism rather than nominalism. Nominalism denies the real existence of universals; universals are merely names or conventional linguistic constructs. Conceptualism also rejects universals as existing independently in the external world. They are mental constructs or representations based on similarities or shared features observed among individual objects. Note that the mind plays an active role in forming universals by abstracting common features. Conceptualism represents the middle ground between realism (which posits independently existing universals) and nominalism (which denies the ontological or epistemological significance of universals entirely). This denial results not only in doubts about the existence of objects but also the existence of God and ultimately gives birth to Western secularism.2Note that Naquib asserts that Aquinas’ distinction of essence or quiddity from existence is based on a misunderstanding of Avicenna’s position since for medieval Islamic philosophers, essence and existence are not radically separated; rather, they are unified in a manner that reflects the interconnectedness of all creation with the Creator. However, the fact remains that existence for Avicenna (as he was read by Western philosophers in the 13th century) is not a constituent of the essence of anything, that is, existence is an accessory accident which must be conferred upon a thing by an external cause in order that it may exist. The validity of historical interpretation of Avicenna may remain an open question, but the logical implications of Avicenna’s view as understood then were correctly drawn out by Aquinas. Naquib writes,
Since a distinction was made between necessary being and contingent being, and with reference to the creatures their being necessary is in thought and not in actuality, a real distinction was thus made between essence and existence in creatures.…This distinction between essence and existence in creatures was apparently made on the basis of Thomas Aquinas’ observation, which in turn seems to have been based on a misunderstanding of Avicenna’s position, that every essence or quiddity can be understood without anything being known of its existing, and that, therefore, the act of existing is other than essence or quiddity. The only Being whose quiddity is also its very act of existing must be God…William of Ockham, less than a hundred years later, to draw the far reaching conclusion that if every essence or quiddity can be understood without any thing being known of its existing, then no amount of knowledge could possibly tell us whether it actually existed. The conclusion drawn from this was that one would never be able to know that anything actually exists… Ultimately this trend of philosophy naturally led to consequences resulting in the casting of doubt also on knowledge of the essence of the creatures, and not merely its existence. The epistemological consequences of doubting the existence and essence of objects created the ‘problem of God’.3Naquib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism 2e (ISTAC, 1993), pp. 9-10.
The doubt and detachment of God from the natural world undermines the metaphysical unity and coherence of reality. The resultant fragmented and desacralized nature allows only for an empirical or materialistic-based science which serves as the intellectual framework of the modern secular order. Naquib asserts,
Christian theology suppressed the sapiential role of the intellect and stressed the scientific role of the purely rational, which can only operate on nature devoid of spiritual significance and follow its own naturalistic logic to its final conclusion. Once the rational became more or less severed from the intellectual, the world of nature is seen as a material, physical object with no connection with the spiritual reality and truth underlying it… Rational philosophy and theology, without the intellectual criterion, naturally led to doubt about the existence of objects as Ockham, deriving from the Thomistic metaphysics of being, was to demonstrate soon after. In the development of science in the West, the logical result of this rationalism and secularization of nature was highlighted by the Copernican revolution in physics in which the decentralization of the earth in the cosmos brought repercussions that reduced the importance of man himself therein. It finally led to man being deprived of cosmic significance; he became terrestrialized and his transcendence was denied him.4Naquib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, pp. 35-36.
In short, modernity and secularism did not begin with the epistemological skepticism of Descartes. Instead, it began when the adoption of Aristotelianism severed Christianity from the spiritual reality and truth which underlie nature. Aquinas’ ontological misconception of the distinction between essence and existence exacerbated the disconnect and the inevitable fruit of nominalism destroyed certainty in knowledge. This trajectory culminated in the rise of the secular worldview that brings devastation to Christianity in the West
However, with all due respect, we have to judge Naquib’s charge against Aquinas to be problematic:
First, we trust that our exposition of Aquinas’ view on the distinction and inseparable relationship between essence and existence in finite existing beings has provided sufficiently evidence to show that Naquib’s charge rests on a simplistic, if not distorted reading of Aquinas metaphysics. Furthermore, Naquib’s claim of the disconnect between intellectus (simple understanding) and ratio (discursive reasoning) in Aquinas’ epistemology is debatable. Indeed, for Aquinas intellectus apprehends universal truths or the foundational principles of reason, and grasps the essence of things intuitively while ratio processes and connects ideas discursively and logically. But both intellect and reason complement one another. Reason relies on the intellect to provide the first principles, while the intellect benefits from the analytical and organizing power of reason. In short, the intellect apprehends divine truths through faith while reason helps to organize and systematize these truths. Aquinas offers a coherent and adequate theory of knowledge and cognition. Naquib can only misrepresent Aquinas’ theory when he approaches it through Islamic lenses instead of analyzing Aquinas’ theory on its own terms.
Second, Naquib fails to distinguish the philosophical differences between Aquinas and Ockham. For example, for Aquinas, God’s will and actions are coherent and rational since they flow his perfect wisdom. In contrast, Ockham’s stress on God’s omnipotence and absolute freedom to the point of God possibly acting contrary to reason and natural law gave birth to a philosophy of voluntarism which sometimes borders onto arbitrariness.
Third, Naquib’s assertion also rests on questionable historical foundations. In laying the blame of secularism squarely on Aquinas rather than Ockham and nominalism, Naquib ignores the protracted historical controversy between the Dominicans (Thomist realists) and Franciscans (Ockhamist nominalists).
Finally, Naquib’s discussion actually masks the complexity of the debate between social analysts who advocate competing theories of the origins of modernity and secularism, for example, 1) Etienne Gilson stressed that the founders of modernity borrowed essential ideas from their medieval predecessors, 2) Karl Löwith argued in Reason in History that modernity is essentially the secularization of Christian ideals, 3) Hans Blumenberg in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age rejected Kant’s idea of modernity as the triumph of reason and saw modernity as a [Nietzschean?] self-assertion of humanity with newfound techno-rational power to reoccupy an empty world after the destruction of medieval civilization and 4) Charles Taylor in The Secular Age identifies many “vectors” of secularization. This includes a) disenchantment of the world which rids nature of spiritual and magical nature elements, b) the replacement of the “porous” self which is vulnerable to spiritual forces with a “buffered” self which is independent, rational and disengaged, c) the emergence of expressive individualism with the autonomous individual who regards spirituality or religion as private quest for personal authenticity, d) the rise of the “immanent frame”, that is, a social imaginary where reference to transcendence is unnecessary since the natural/immanent order is complete and self-sufficient for understanding reality, etc.
The complexity of the debate should remind us to eschew dogmatic assertions when we theorize about the origins of modernity and secularism.
The fact that Naquib fails to distinguish the philosophical differences between Aquinas and Ockham says it all. To posit that secularism can be traced back to Aquinas as the “progenitor” is simply not a serious and sustained thesis. In fact, it’s arguable if he even understand Ockham or Nominalism. Based on his assertion that, “… William of Ockham … [drew] the far reaching conclusion that if every essence or quiddity can be understood without any thing being known of its existing, then no amount of knowledge could possibly tell us whether it actually existed. The conclusion drawn from this was that one would never be able to know that anything actually exists”. He seems to conflate or confuse the 11th century monk Gaunilo – in his famous counterargument against Anselm – with Ockham.