In Defence of Secondary Causation Against Occasionalism

So, if created things have no actions productive of effects, it follows that no nature of anything would ever be known through the effect. And thus, all the knowledge of natural science is taken away from us, for the demonstrations in it are chiefly derived from the effect.  (Aquinas SCG 3.69.18)

Secondary Causes: Their Relation to the Primary Cause (God)
The Primary Cause (God) is the uncaused cause, the source of all beings and existence.1“For Scholastics, in order to be caused (whether caused to exist or caused to undergo some change), a thing must in some way be a mixture of act and potency, since to change or come into being is to go from potency to act. But then what is pure actuality and thus devoid of potency not only need not have a cause, but could not have had one. Hence it is false to say that everything has a cause. The principle of causality says that what changes requires a cause, that what comes into being has a cause, that what is composite, contingent or merely participates in being needs a cause, and in general that what goes from potency to act requires a cause. But that is very different from saying that absolutely everything has a cause. When the Scholastic says that God is uncaused, that is not because God is being made an arbitrary exception to a general rule. It is rather because God is taken to be pure actuality, non-composite, non-contingent, and so forth.” Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (editiones scholasticae, 2014), p. 107. God continues to sustain the universe at every moment to ensure its continued existence and operation.

Secondary Causes like finite living beings and natural forces possess causal powers. For example, fire has the power to heat and a human has to power to make choices and initiate action. Everything must have a cause. A thing’s nature must be caused by another, that is, it is causally dependent on another agent in a chain of causes. Since these agents are dependent, there are accordingly regarded as secondary” causes. This chain of causes operates as an interactive system established by God. However, each “secondary” cause is ultimately dependent on the power of the Primary Cause (God).

What is the relationship between primary cause and secondary cause? The relationship between a craftsman and his tool provides a helpful analogy: The craftsman (God) is the primary cause of the artifact but this does not undermine the genuine role contributed by the tool (secondary cause) in the production of the artifact.

In Defence of Secondary Causation Against Occasionalism
According to occasionalism2Occasionalism was a dominant philosophy school in medieval Islam. Its prominent advocates included Al-Ash’ari (10th C), founder Ash’arite occasionalism and following him, Al-Ghazali (12th C) and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (13th C). According to Islamic occasionalism, what appears to be causal relationships in nature are merely God’s habit (’adah) of creating certain events after others, with no necessary connection between them. “God has decreed as a matter of habit (’adah) that the succession of accidents shall correspond to a certain pattern… But it is clear that God who is the ultimate Agent could alter this course of habit freely.” See Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (Routledge, 1958, 2008), p. 30, created substances do not have intrinsic power of causation to bring about changes or events. There is no secondary causation since all events are directly caused by God.  The discussion below defends the necessity of secondary causation by highlighting some weaknesses of occasionalism. Continue reading “In Defence of Secondary Causation Against Occasionalism”

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    “For Scholastics, in order to be caused (whether caused to exist or caused to undergo some change), a thing must in some way be a mixture of act and potency, since to change or come into being is to go from potency to act. But then what is pure actuality and thus devoid of potency not only need not have a cause, but could not have had one. Hence it is false to say that everything has a cause. The principle of causality says that what changes requires a cause, that what comes into being has a cause, that what is composite, contingent or merely participates in being needs a cause, and in general that what goes from potency to act requires a cause. But that is very different from saying that absolutely everything has a cause. When the Scholastic says that God is uncaused, that is not because God is being made an arbitrary exception to a general rule. It is rather because God is taken to be pure actuality, non-composite, non-contingent, and so forth.” Edward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (editiones scholasticae, 2014), p. 107.
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    Occasionalism was a dominant philosophy school in medieval Islam. Its prominent advocates included Al-Ash’ari (10th C), founder Ash’arite occasionalism and following him, Al-Ghazali (12th C) and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (13th C). According to Islamic occasionalism, what appears to be causal relationships in nature are merely God’s habit (’adah) of creating certain events after others, with no necessary connection between them. “God has decreed as a matter of habit (’adah) that the succession of accidents shall correspond to a certain pattern… But it is clear that God who is the ultimate Agent could alter this course of habit freely.” See Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism (Routledge, 1958, 2008), p. 30

A Corrective to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’ Misreading of Aquinas’ Philosophy in his Book, “Islam and Secularism”

Note: This post was earlier published as an appendix to the post, Link –  The Primacy of “Existence” over “Essence” : A Foundational Principle of Christian “Existential” Philosophy.

Our exposition of Aquinas’ thesis on the primacy of existence over essence provides a corrective to Malaysia’s premier philosopher, Naquib al-Attas, who claims that Aquinas’ misguided notion of distinction between existence and essence led to the development of nominalism (or Ockhamism) which denies the ontological reality of universals and asserts that universals are merely names (nomina) or abstract concepts.1Strictly speaking, Ockham’s view should be described as conceptualism rather than nominalism. Nominalism denies the real existence of universals; universals are merely names or conventional linguistic constructs. Conceptualism also rejects universals as existing independently in the external world. They are mental constructs or representations based on similarities or shared features observed among individual objects. Note that the mind plays an active role in forming universals by abstracting common features. Conceptualism represents the middle ground between realism (which posits independently existing universals) and nominalism (which denies the ontological or epistemological significance of universals entirely). However, the boundary between conceptualism to nominalism is blurr, given the proximity between language and mental concepts. Hence the suggestion that Ockham view be described as “conceptualist nominalism”. This denial results not only in doubts about the existence of objects but also the existence of God and ultimately gives birth to Western secularism.2Note that Naquib asserts that Aquinas’ distinction of essence or quiddity from existence is based on a misunderstanding of Avicenna’s position since for medieval Islamic philosophers, essence and existence are not radically separated; rather, they are unified in a manner that reflects the interconnectedness of all creation with the Creator. However, the fact remains that existence for Avicenna (as he was read by Western philosophers in the 13th century) is not a constituent of the essence of anything, that is, existence is an accessory accident which must be conferred upon a thing by an external cause in order that it may exist. The validity of historical interpretation of Avicenna may remain an open question, but the logical implications of Avicenna’s view as understood then were correctly drawn out by Aquinas. Naquib writes, Continue reading “A Corrective to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’ Misreading of Aquinas’ Philosophy in his Book, “Islam and Secularism””

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    Strictly speaking, Ockham’s view should be described as conceptualism rather than nominalism. Nominalism denies the real existence of universals; universals are merely names or conventional linguistic constructs. Conceptualism also rejects universals as existing independently in the external world. They are mental constructs or representations based on similarities or shared features observed among individual objects. Note that the mind plays an active role in forming universals by abstracting common features. Conceptualism represents the middle ground between realism (which posits independently existing universals) and nominalism (which denies the ontological or epistemological significance of universals entirely). However, the boundary between conceptualism to nominalism is blurr, given the proximity between language and mental concepts. Hence the suggestion that Ockham view be described as “conceptualist nominalism”.
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    Note that Naquib asserts that Aquinas’ distinction of essence or quiddity from existence is based on a misunderstanding of Avicenna’s position since for medieval Islamic philosophers, essence and existence are not radically separated; rather, they are unified in a manner that reflects the interconnectedness of all creation with the Creator. However, the fact remains that existence for Avicenna (as he was read by Western philosophers in the 13th century) is not a constituent of the essence of anything, that is, existence is an accessory accident which must be conferred upon a thing by an external cause in order that it may exist. The validity of historical interpretation of Avicenna may remain an open question, but the logical implications of Avicenna’s view as understood then were correctly drawn out by Aquinas.

Bonus Lecture: Thomas Aquinas, Soul’s Powers (Faculties), Cognition & Proof of God’s Existence

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
(1225-1274). Painting attributed to Botticelli, 1481-82.

Video Link – Thomas Aquinas, Soul’s Powers (Faculties), Cognition & Proof of God’s Existence

Contents of Video

Aquinas’ hylomorphism
– Soul and body are distinguishable realities, ‘incomplete substances’; but together they form one substance, the human being.
– The Soul as a Subsisting Form Configuring Matter.
– Soul survives death (contra Aristotle).
– Powers (faculties) of the human soul.

Aquinas on Cognition-Knowledge
– Common sense, phantasia, agent intellect, possible intellect.
– Sensible species, phantasms
– Active intellect & intelligible species, inner word or concept, possible intellect
– Four different stages – the reception of sensible species; their processing into phantasms; the abstraction of intelligible species; and their processing into intellected intentions.

Arguments for Existence of God
– The First Way: God, the Prime Mover
– The Second Way: God, the First Cause
– The Third Way: God, the Necessary Being
– The Fourth Way: God, the Absolute Being
– The Fifth Way: God, the Grand Designer

You can watch the video at
Thomas Aquinas, Soul’s Powers (Faculties), Cognition & Proofs God’s Existence

Forthcoming Uploads – New series of videos on Biblical-Nicene Trinitarianism vs Early Heresies.

Bonus Lecture: Aristotle Matter-Form & Aquinas Essence-Existence

VIDEO LINK – Aristotle Matter-Form & Aquinas Essence-Existence

Contents of Lecture
Part 1. Basic Concepts in Aristotle’s Philosophy
Basic agreements and disagreements between Plato and Aristotle
Aristotelian realist metaphysics
Matter, Form and Substance
Categories
Hylomorphism – matter + form
Path to knowledge – experience, abstraction and insight into universals.
The Four Causes – 1) matter, 2) form, 3) agency/efficiency, 4) purpose /teleology
Potentiality-Actuality in a hierarchical dynamic universe
Prime Mover – Pure Actuality

Part 2. Thomas Aquinas (Introductory Comments)
Essence & Existence of God.
Contrast between Aquinas & Avicenna
Exod. 3:14 – Act prior to existence
Aquinas as a moderate realist (vs Plato extreme realist). Universals exist in the intellect, but they have an immediate basis in reality.

You can watch the video at
VIDEO LINK – Aristotle Matter-Form & Aquinas Essence-Existence