Category: Philosophy Christian

God and the Laws of Logic. Archetypal Ectypal Model vs Theistic Conceptual Realism Model

The Theistic Conceptual Realism Model view of relationship between God and logic

The Archetypal Ectypal Model view of relationship between God and logic

Key:
AEM = Archetypal-Ectypal Model.
TCRM = Theistic Conceptual Realism Model
ATSC = Archetypal Trinitarian Self Coherence
I =  ‘‘l’’ refers to the laws of logic as we know it, an accommodated form of the ectypal laws of thought in God’s mind
————- Continue reading “God and the Laws of Logic. Archetypal Ectypal Model vs Theistic Conceptual Realism Model”

Herman Bavinck Archetypal-Ectypal Model of Knowledge and True Theology. BB003

Divine revelation is the foundation of true knowledge of God
For Herman Bavinck, the only adequate foundation for human knowledge of God is God’s self-disclosure. Without divine revelation, human knowledge remains speculative and distorted by finitude and sin. Divine revelation bridges the knowledge gap between God and man, but what is the relationship between knowledge in God and knowledge that is revealed to us? Continue reading “Herman Bavinck Archetypal-Ectypal Model of Knowledge and True Theology. BB003”

Herman Bavinck’s Metaphysics of Knowledge. BB002

Herman Bavinck’s Metaphysics of Knowledge. BB002

Knowledge beyond the Immanuel Kant’s Bounds of Pure Reason
“Pure reason” refers to Immanuel Kant’s idea of the faculty of reason operating independently and applying a priori concepts or innate forms and categories of thought to impose order to makes sense of sensations received from the world. Effectively, the mind becomes the measure and bounds of all knowledge. But we can never be sure if there is correspondence between the structured experience in mind and reality outside the mind. Kant’s conclusion is that there is an unbridgeable gap between what the mind perceives with its constructed concepts and representations (phenomena) and the world or the things-in-themselves (noumena).

Herman Bavinck agrees with Kant that the mind plays a determinative role for all meaningful experience but Bavinck argues that Kant’s epistemological dualism undermines knowledge altogether. “For, says idealism [Kant], if a thing and the representation of a thing are two different realities, then we must despair of knowledge of the thing. Since we simply can never test our representation of a thing by the thing itself, we can never step outside of ourselves, of our representational world…We always remain inside the circle of our representations and never come into contact with the thing itself, only with our representation of the thing. Stated differently, only that which is conscious exists for us; I can only think the thought, not the thing itself. That which is not my thought is inconceivable, unknowable to me; it does not exist for me.” [RD 1.216] Continue reading “Herman Bavinck’s Metaphysics of Knowledge. BB002”

Metaphysics of Knowledge and Empirical-Mathematical Science. Jacques Maritain’s Three Degrees of Abstraction

The earlier post, Models of Integration of Science and Faith – Science and Christianity: Part 5/6, analyses different models for the relationship between of science and Christianity: conflict, independence, complementation, dialogue, integration and transformation. However, the absence of discussion on the epistemological foundations underlying the typology of models gives the impression that it is based on pragmatic and arbitrary criteria. What is missing is a philosophy of nature and metaphysics of knowledge to ensure that the process of integration is empirically well founded and logically coherent . The purpose of the present post on Jacques Maritain’s Three Degrees of Abstraction is to fill a lacuna found in the earlier discussion.

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Many scientists today assert that modern empirical science and the “scientific method” is the best, if not the final arbiter of any truth claim about the world and reality. The premise of this assertion is that physical reality is the only reality and all truth claims must be empirically verifiable. Continue reading “Metaphysics of Knowledge and Empirical-Mathematical Science. Jacques Maritain’s Three Degrees of Abstraction”

A Corrective to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’ Misreading of Aquinas’ Philosophy in his Book, “Islam and Secularism”

Note: This post was earlier published as an appendix to the post, Link –  The Primacy of “Existence” over “Essence” : A Foundational Principle of Christian “Existential” Philosophy.

Our exposition of Aquinas’ thesis on the primacy of existence over essence provides a corrective to Malaysia’s premier philosopher, Naquib al-Attas, who claims that Aquinas’ misguided notion of distinction between existence and essence led to the development of nominalism (or Ockhamism) which denies the ontological reality of universals and asserts that universals are merely names (nomina) or abstract concepts.1Strictly speaking, Ockham’s view should be described as conceptualism rather than nominalism. Nominalism denies the real existence of universals; universals are merely names or conventional linguistic constructs. Conceptualism also rejects universals as existing independently in the external world. They are mental constructs or representations based on similarities or shared features observed among individual objects. Note that the mind plays an active role in forming universals by abstracting common features. Conceptualism represents the middle ground between realism (which posits independently existing universals) and nominalism (which denies the ontological or epistemological significance of universals entirely). However, the boundary between conceptualism to nominalism is blurr, given the proximity between language and mental concepts. Hence the suggestion that Ockham view be described as “conceptualist nominalism”. This denial results not only in doubts about the existence of objects but also the existence of God and ultimately gives birth to Western secularism.2Note that Naquib asserts that Aquinas’ distinction of essence or quiddity from existence is based on a misunderstanding of Avicenna’s position since for medieval Islamic philosophers, essence and existence are not radically separated; rather, they are unified in a manner that reflects the interconnectedness of all creation with the Creator. However, the fact remains that existence for Avicenna (as he was read by Western philosophers in the 13th century) is not a constituent of the essence of anything, that is, existence is an accessory accident which must be conferred upon a thing by an external cause in order that it may exist. The validity of historical interpretation of Avicenna may remain an open question, but the logical implications of Avicenna’s view as understood then were correctly drawn out by Aquinas. Naquib writes, Continue reading “A Corrective to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’ Misreading of Aquinas’ Philosophy in his Book, “Islam and Secularism””

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    Strictly speaking, Ockham’s view should be described as conceptualism rather than nominalism. Nominalism denies the real existence of universals; universals are merely names or conventional linguistic constructs. Conceptualism also rejects universals as existing independently in the external world. They are mental constructs or representations based on similarities or shared features observed among individual objects. Note that the mind plays an active role in forming universals by abstracting common features. Conceptualism represents the middle ground between realism (which posits independently existing universals) and nominalism (which denies the ontological or epistemological significance of universals entirely). However, the boundary between conceptualism to nominalism is blurr, given the proximity between language and mental concepts. Hence the suggestion that Ockham view be described as “conceptualist nominalism”.
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    Note that Naquib asserts that Aquinas’ distinction of essence or quiddity from existence is based on a misunderstanding of Avicenna’s position since for medieval Islamic philosophers, essence and existence are not radically separated; rather, they are unified in a manner that reflects the interconnectedness of all creation with the Creator. However, the fact remains that existence for Avicenna (as he was read by Western philosophers in the 13th century) is not a constituent of the essence of anything, that is, existence is an accessory accident which must be conferred upon a thing by an external cause in order that it may exist. The validity of historical interpretation of Avicenna may remain an open question, but the logical implications of Avicenna’s view as understood then were correctly drawn out by Aquinas.

The Primacy of “Existence” over “Essence”: A Foundational Principle of Christian “Existential” Philosophy

Note also the appendix: A corrective to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’ misreading of Aquinas’ philosophy in his book, Islam and Secularism.

A. Definition of terms “Existence” and “Essence”
In classical metaphysics, “essence” refers to what a thing is – its defining characteristics or nature. “Existence,” on the other hand, refers to the fact that a thing is – its actuality or the act of being.1 F.C. Copleston gives a careful explanation of the distinction and relationship between “essence” and “existence”: “Essence is that which answers the question what a thing is; it is substance considered as definable…Existence, on the other hand, is the act by which an essence or substance is or has being…Essence is the potential metaphysical component in a thing (it is that which is or has being, the quod est), while existence is the act by which essence has being (it is the quo est). This distinction is not, be it noted, a physical distinction between two separable things; it is a metaphysical distinction within a thing… And inasmuch as the substance, considered as essence, is that which has being, that of which we say that it exists, it can be said to ‘receive’ existence. But these ways of speaking are not meant to imply either that existence is something apart from an essence or that an essence has objective reality apart from existence. The distinction between them is a distinction within a concrete finite being” F.C. Copleston, Aquinas (Penguin, 1955, 1975), p. 101. Etienne Gilson notes that philosophers who were influenced by Greek philosophy treated essence as primary, with existence being a secondary or accidental attribute. Gilson critiques Platonic-Aristotelian and medieval Islamic philosophers like Avicenna and modern rationalist philosophers like Descartes and Kant for subordinating existence to essence.

Étienne Gilson’s book,  The Elements of Christian Philosophy (Doubleday, 1960) offers a lucid exposition of his argument that “existence” (esse) is more fundamental than “essence” (essentia) within the framework of Thomistic thought which Gilson deploys to critique of certain trends in medieval and modern philosophy. For Gilson, Aquinas’s insight was revolutionary because it inverted the traditional emphasis on essence. Gilson lays out his argument that existence is more fundamental than essence in his book, The Elements of Christian Philosophy. Continue reading “The Primacy of “Existence” over “Essence”: A Foundational Principle of Christian “Existential” Philosophy”

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    F.C. Copleston gives a careful explanation of the distinction and relationship between “essence” and “existence”: “Essence is that which answers the question what a thing is; it is substance considered as definable…Existence, on the other hand, is the act by which an essence or substance is or has being…Essence is the potential metaphysical component in a thing (it is that which is or has being, the quod est), while existence is the act by which essence has being (it is the quo est). This distinction is not, be it noted, a physical distinction between two separable things; it is a metaphysical distinction within a thing… And inasmuch as the substance, considered as essence, is that which has being, that of which we say that it exists, it can be said to ‘receive’ existence. But these ways of speaking are not meant to imply either that existence is something apart from an essence or that an essence has objective reality apart from existence. The distinction between them is a distinction within a concrete finite being” F.C. Copleston, Aquinas (Penguin, 1955, 1975), p. 101.